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The Treaty of Nice which was signed on 26 February
should mark the end of a prolonged phase of adjustment
for the European Union. The EU has been trying for the
last ten years to adapt to the end of the Cold War division
of Europe and, more recently, to prepare itself positively
for a massive expansion to 27 members or more. The
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which concluded in
Amsterdam in 1997 was something of a false summit
with regard to the institutional reforms which are essential
before enlargement can proceed. A new IGC was thus
held in 2000, focusing on the three issues ‘left over’ from
Amsterdam – size and composition of the Commission,
weighting of votes in the Council and possible extension
of qualified majority voting (QMV) – as well as ‘other
necessary amendments to the Treaties arising as regards
the European institutions in connection with the above
issues and in implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam’.
The Feira European Council in June 2000 agreed that
the new provisions on closer (now ‘enhanced’)
cooperation should also be considered.
The IGC 2000 opened in Portugal on Valentine’s
Day. After nearly ten months of preparatory work, and
four days of most unromantic wrangling, the Conference
came to a rather tearful conclusion in Nice in the early
hours of 11 December 2000. Tough words were heard as
tired leaders departed, and an unprecedented degree of
bad temper was rapidly reported as having characterised
parts of the meeting.
Many immediate comments were critical. The content
of the draft treaty was seen by some as failing to take the
firm steps essential to avoid future problems but rather
introducing new complexities in the decision-making
process. EU negotiations seemed to have been reduced
to bargaining over relative power, instead of constructive
compromise in the common interest, with particular
criticism directed at the way in which the French
Presidency had handled things. And the whole IGC
process had apparently ended only in conflict and
confusion.
Where reactions were more favourable, the
underlying feeling seemed to be basically one of relief
that there was a Treaty at all. One of the main obstacles
to enlargement had been removed, and that was what
mattered most. Indeed, in this light, Nice could be
presented as a positive triumph. In the face of an urgent
need to reach agreement, the Member States had managed
to reach a compromise even over some of the most
sensitive issues at stake so far in the integration process.
This article aims to give a balanced evaluation of
what was agreed – and how. It first looks at the results of
the IGC in each of the main issue areas and then offers
some thoughts about the problems and achievements of
the IGC 2000, the implications of the Nice Treaty for the
future, and the steps which are now to be taken on the
road to .... yet another IGC.
Size and Composition of the Commission
The only specific agreement in this case was that the five
largest countries will lose their right to name two
Commissioners: as of 1 January 2005, the Commission
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will include ‘one national of each of the Member States’.
Further changes will take place ‘[w]hen the Union
consists of 27 Member States’. The maximum number of
Commissioners in EU27 is not fixed: the Protocol on the
Enlargement of the European Union only states that the
number ‘shall be less than the number of Member States’
and will be agreed by the Council, acting unanimously.
Finally, a future ‘rotation system based on the principle
of equality’ is agreed. The basic principle is defined to
be that ‘the difference between the total number of terms
of office held by nationals of any given pair of Member
States may never be more than one’, but with the intriguing
qualification that ‘each successive college shall be so
composed as to reflect
satisfactorily the demo-
graphic and geograph-
ical range of all the
Member States of the
Union’. However, the
implementing arrange-
ments are to be adopted
by the Council, by
unanimity, only after
signing the treaty of
accession of the 27th
Member State of the
Union.
The smaller coun-
tries were thus success-
ful, at least for the
medium term, in defen-
ding their position. They continue to believe that a
strong and independent Commission, like a strong legal
system, is an essential guarantee of their interests in the
face of the larger countries. The presence of a national
of each country is not only felt to increase public
acceptance of the institutions. It is also seen as reassurance
both that all interests will really be taken into account
within the Commission and that the political role of the
Commission will not be weakened. The argument that
a smaller Commission would be a more effective and
more managerial body free of national ties and thus
better able to defend small countries’ interests is still
outweighed by the belief – which seemed to be confirmed
at Biarritz in October 2000 – that at least some of the
larger countries saw the reduction in the number of
Commissioners as a means to reduce the role of the
Commission to that of a purely administrative body.
Since a Commission of 20 to 27 Members clearly
requires stronger ‘organisation’, however, it was agreed
that the President ‘shall decide on its internal organisation
in order to ensure that it acts consistently, efficiently and
on the basis of collegiality’; as well as allocate and
reshuffle responsibilities among Members. The President
will be able to oblige a Member to resign, ‘after obtaining
the approval of the Commission’, and ‘shall appoint
Vice-Presidents’.2
The Weighting of Votes and Threshold for
Qualified-Majority Voting
A generally accepted aim of re-weighting was to ensure
that any winning coalition under QMV will represent a
reasonable majority of the population, and that decisions
cannot be blocked by too small a minority. At present,
the minimum share of EU population represented by a
possible winning coalition is around 58% (down from
over 70% in EC9); the minimum share represented by a
possible blocking minority is around 13%. Extra-
polation of the present system would mean that a winning
coalition in EU27 could represent barely 50% of the
population, while a coalition representing a large majority





relative position of the
larger Member States.
From the 1950s until
1986, only one of the
big states could be out-
voted. In EC12 and
EU15, two big coun-
tries could be outvoted,
while the Big Five
together could not out-
vote the rest (although
they accounted for
around 80% of the total
population in EU15). Would it now be accepted that
three of the big countries would let themselves be out-
voted?
The instruments available were an indirect
recognition of relative population through a re-
weighting of votes in favour of the larger countries and/
or the addition of a dual key in the sense of also directly
checking that a winning coalition, however it is
weighted, represents a specific percentage of total
population.
Many problems would not have arisen had there
been acceptance of the double simple majority. Under
this system, each Member State would have one vote.
Decisions would require a majority of the states, so long
as this also reflected a majority of the EU population.3
This system would most clearly reflect the dual nature
of the EU as a union of states and of citizens. It would
have been simple to understand and relatively easy to
manage. It would, by far, do most to increase ease of
decision-making. It would be a once-off decision which
would not require complex and repeated calculations as
enlargement proceeds. And it would have made
demographic weight count while avoiding dif-
ferentiation between pairs of countries which had so far,
despite having different populations, enjoyed equal
voting rights.
However, the big countries generally preferred a re-
weighting of votes to any system of dual majority,
One of the main obstacles to
enlargement has been removed… the
Member States managed to reach a
compromise even over some of the
most sensitive issues at stake so far in
the integration process.4 Eipascope 2001/1 http://www.eipa.nl
usually on grounds of greater simplicity. In addition,
those Member States which ‘renounced’ their second
Commissioner felt, some more strongly than others, that
they had to be directly ‘compensated’. Moreover, it may
never have been completely realistic to imagine placing
Germany or France on the same standing qua states as
Luxembourg or Malta. Other ‘objective’ keys aiming to
provide a simple principle which could be extended
without re-negotiation (such as the Swedish ideas based
on square roots of population) were also rejected.
The result was a triple threshold for qualified majority
decisions, with an even greater degree of complexity
than the present arrangements.
• a threshold of votes of well over 70%;
• a majority of Member States; and, if requested,
• verification that this represents at least 62% of the
EU population.
The weighting
The future system of weighting is basically derived from
proposals by which the present Member States would all
receive an increased number of votes (so that ‘all would
have prizes’) but in different proportions. There had also
been some prior agreement that it would help to double
the numbers anyway, in order to increase the scope for
differentiation in the votes
attributed to new Member States.
Beyond this, the negotiations
were strongly shaped by President
Chirac’s resisting Chancellor
Schröder’s demand that Germany
should now have more votes than
France in view of the difference in
population of 22 million – while
at the same time proposing, as EU
Presidency, that differentiation
should apply between other
countries.
This led to renewed sensitivity
between Belgium and the Nether-
lands. The Belgian position in the
run-up to the IGC had been to
accept a ‘decoupling’ but only if
the French also accepted having
fewer votes than Germany. In the
end, Belgium only agreed to such
a decoupling without Franco-
German differentiation in return
for having 12 votes compared to
the Netherlands’ 13, rather than
the 11 originally proposed, and for an increase from 20
to 22 in the number of Belgian MEPs after enlargement.
Spain continued to press its ‘special position’ as a
medium-to-big country which had, on accession,
accepted eight votes to the big countries’ ten in exchange
for two Commissioners. In the run-up to Nice, the Spanish
Government also argued that it would only agree to
continue having less votes than France, Italy and the UK
if the Germans were to have more. Although Spain did
not succeed in its stated goal of obtaining the same
influence in blocking decisions as the large countries,
it did receive the greatest proportional increase in votes.
This, however, contributed to sensitivities with Portugal,
which, having had five votes compared to Spain’s eight,
was now offered 11 compared to 28 in the first proposals.
The result was to give Portugal 12 compared to Spain’s
27, as well as two more MEPs.
There was also a clear belief that applicant countries
did not merit the same treatment as present Member
States. In the first Presidency proposals at Nice, Poland
was given fewer votes than Spain, Lithuania five votes
compared to Ireland’s seven, and Malta three to
Luxembourg’s four, although these three pairs of
countries have nearly identical population sizes.
Romania was to be offered the same number of votes as
the Netherlands despite having a population which is
40% larger. The Polish situation was rapidly sorted out.
Only in the final phases, however, was Lithuania given
equal treatment with Ireland and Romania a slight
increase compared to the Netherlands (14 to 13). Malta
was left in its peculiarly disadvantaged position in both
Council and Parliament.4 The distribution which was
finally agreed is shown in Table 1.
The threshold of votes
In the aftermath of Nice there was confusion even over
what had actually been agreed concerning the threshold
of votes for decisions under QMV. First, the Protocol on
the Enlargement of the European Union, which deals
with the Commission and the present Member States,
states that as of 1 January 2005 the present Member
States will have the number of votes indicated in the
table above. For EU15 the threshold indicated in the first
Table 1: Shares of Population, Council Votes and European Parliament
Seats  in EU 27, as Agreed at Nice
Population Present Votes Future Votes Present Seats Future Seats
Germany 82.0 17.0% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 99 15.8% 99 13.5%
UK 59.2 12.3% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 87 13.9% 72 9.8%
France 59.0 12.3% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 87 13.9% 72 9.8%
Italy 57.6 12.0% 10 11.5% 29 8.4% 87 13.9% 72 9.8%
Spain 39.4 8.2% 8 9.2% 27 7.8% 64 10.2% 50 6.8%
Poland 38.7 8.0% 27 7.8% 50 6.8%
Romania 22.5 4.7% 14 4.1% 33 4.5%
Netherlands 15.8 3.3% 5 5.7% 13 3.8% 31 5.0% 25 3.4%
Greece 10.5 2.2% 5 5.7% 12 3.5% 25 4.0% 22 3.0%
Czech Rep. 10.3 2.1% 12 3.5% 20 2.7%
Belgium 10.2 2.1% 5 5.7% 12 3.5% 25 4.0% 22 3.0%
Hungary 10.1 2.1% 12 3.5% 20 2.7%
Portugal 10.0 2.1% 5 5.7% 12 3.5% 25 4.0% 22 3.0%
Sweden 8.9 1.8% 4 4.6% 10 2.9% 22 3.5% 18 2.5%
Bulgaria 8.2 1.7% 10 2.9% 17 2.3%
Austria 8.1 1.7% 4 4.6% 10 2.9% 21 3.4% 17 2.3%
Slovakia 5.4 1.1% 7 2.0% 13 1.8%
Denmark 5.3 1.1% 3 3.4% 7 2.0% 16 2.6% 13 1.8%
Finland 5.2 1.1% 3 3.4% 7 2.0% 16 2.6% 13 1.8%
Ireland 3.7 0.8% 3 3.4% 7 2.0% 15 2.4% 12 1.6%
Lithuania 3.7 0.8% 7 2.0% 12 1.6%
Latvia 2.4 0.5% 4 1.2% 8 1.1%
Slovenia 2.0 0.4% 4 1.2% 7 1.0%
Estonia 1.4 0.3% 4 1.2% 6 0.8%
Cyprus 0.8 0.2% 4 1.2% 6 0.8%
Luxembourg 0.4 0.1% 2 2.3% 4 1.2% 6 1.0% 6 0.8%
Malta 0.4 0.1% 3 0.9% 5 0.7%
TOTAL 481.2 87 345 626 732http://www.eipa.nl Eipascope 2001/1 5
provisional text was 170 votes out of 237. This, however,
would be 71.7%, somewhat higher than the current level
of 71.3% (62 out of 87). To stay at the current level, 168
would have been the obvious figure. Second, that
threshold is to be adjusted proportionately with every
accession on the condition that the qualified majority
threshold expressed in votes does not exceed the
threshold resulting from the table in the Declaration on
the Enlargement of the European Union (as in Table 1),
which stipulates the
common position of the
Member States in the
accession conferences.
This indicates a thres-
hold of 258 votes out of
345, which would repre-
sent an increase in the
percentage of votes
required to 74.8%. Fin-
ally, a separate Declar-
ation on the qualified
majority threshold and
the number of votes for a blocking minority stated not
only that the maximum percentage for a qualified
majority would rise to 73.4% but also that the blocking
minority is to rise from 88 to 91 when all candidate
countries will have joined. This would mean reducing
the voting threshold to 255, giving yet another figure of
73.9%.
A revised Provisional Text dated 22 December
reduced the threshold for EU15 from 170 to 169; but
confirmed both the figure of 258 in the Declaration on
the Enlargement and the agreement in the Declaration
on the qualified majority threshold to raise the blocking
minority to 91. The question may have to be resolved
finally at the next IGC.
The majority of states
Re-weighting faces an inherent tension between the
representation of states and the representation of citizens.
At present a winning coalition necessarily has a majority
of Member States – no
combination of seven
countries can reach the
threshold of votes re-
quired for a qualified
majority. The further




the easier it is for a
qualified majority of votes to be reached by a minority
of Member States. To deal with this part of this problem,
there was preliminary agreement before Nice that,
whatever the eventual weightings, a qualified majority
would have to represent a majority of Member States.
The threshold of 258 out of 345 happens to be just
the right number needed to ensure that a qualified
majority of votes always represents a majority of States,5
in which case the second majority condition would only
be relevant during the transition from EU 15 to EU 27.
A blocking minority of 91, however, would change this.
The 62% of population
With a threshold of 258 or 255, the minimum share of
total population represented by a winning coalition
would be around 58% – more or less what it is today.6
However, as part of the
negotiations for a re-
weighting of votes in
which France retained
parity with Germany, a
third condition was
added by which any
Member State may re-
quest verification that
the qualified majority
comprises at least 62%
of the population. This
means in practice that
Germany and any two of the other three largest countries
(UK, France, Italy) – such a trio together accounting for
over 40% – will still be able jointly to block any
decision, whatever happens in terms of votes cast. Equally
important, perhaps, is the very fact that relative
demographic weight is now explicitly stated for the first
time as a condition for decision-making.
Qualified-Majority Voting
Little change occurred in the end concerning the
‘possible extension’ of QMV. There had already been
consensus by June 2000 that ‘a number of constitutional
and quasi-constitutional issues intrinsically call for
unanimity’.7 The French Presidency in its Revised
Summary of 23 November listed nearly 50 provisions
which could be changed to QMV. Whereas a few Member
States (e.g. Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland) had
virtually no objection to making QMV the rule, almost
all others opposed some part of the list and either vetoed
any change or succeed-
ed in introducing de-
lays and conditions.
The British Govern-
ment, with some sup-
port, defended its ‘red
line’ areas of taxation
and social security. The
French Government
agreed to extend QMV
to trade in services, but
not to cultural and audiovisual services. Spain put off
any change affecting the structural funds and the
cohesion fund until 2007, and even then only on the
condition that the financial perspective after 2007 will
previously have been adopted. Germany blocked QMV
in some areas in Justice and Home Affairs; while asylum
policy is only to move to QMV provided that the
It is hard to believe that there will be
any improvement in efficiency,
understood as the ease of decision-
making.
All this fuss about the relative
percentages of votes and majority
thresholds may distract attention.6 Eipascope 2001/1 http://www.eipa.nl
Council has previously adopted the common rules and
basic principles by unanimity, and most of immigration
and other areas only in 2004.
The provisions in which QMV is to be introduced are
therefore largely limited to procedural questions,8 certain
kinds of international agreement,9 asylum and
immigration and a few other policy decisions.10 Of these,
co-decision only applies in some cases.
The European Parliament
The European Parliament was affected by two kinds of
decision at Nice: the distribution of seats in the light of
the ceiling of 700 agreed at Amsterdam; and the
evolution of its institutional role in the EU system.
Franco-German differentiation had been imple-
mented in the Parlia-
ment since 1992. This
differentiation was in
fact increased at Nice as
part of the overall packet
in which France retained




Italy and the UK each
dropped from 81 to 72. Moreover, Belgium, Portugal
and Greece also received extra seats at the end as
compensation for the voting arrangements in the Council
– although the Czech Republic and Hungary, despite
similar populations, did not, a situation which they later
angrily vowed to fight. The consequence of all this was
to exceed the ceiling of 700. A new limit was set at 732,
thus somewhat weakening the credibility of other target
figures and commitments.




placed on an equal
footing as the Com-
mission, the Council
and the Member States
with regard to the right
to bring actions for
judicial review of Com-
munity acts by the Court
of Justice. However, co-
decision was not recog-
nised as a necessary
corollary of qualified-
majority voting in the
Council. A further step
was made in recognis-
ing the importance of
political parties at Euro-
pean level in creating a European political debate, and
thus boosting public interest in the European Parliament.
Regulations governing such parties are now to be
adopted, ‘in particular the rules regarding their funding’.
Yet at the same time, the distribution of seats was not
only being negotiated very much in terms of national
representation. It tended to be treated as a means to
compensate changes in the Council voting weights, and
was agreed without any consultation of the European
Parliament itself.
Enhanced Cooperation
Important changes were introduced in the provisions on
enhanced (or ‘closer’) cooperation, by which deeper
integration can be pursued in particular areas without
the participation of all countries. The main changes
have been to relax the ‘enabling clauses’ introduced at
Amsterdam  – that is, the general conditions and
procedures contained
in the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, and the
specific provisions in-




nal Matters (the new
‘Third Pillar’). First, the
simple right of veto has
been removed. At present the Council may decide by
qualified majority to authorise closer cooperation.
However, if any Member State declares that it opposes
the authorisation ‘for important and stated reasons of
national policy’, the Council may by qualified majority
refer the proposal to the European Council11 for a
unanimous decision. This ‘emergency brake’ has been
taken away, or at least made less explicit – the Nice text
indicates that in the EC and the Third Pillar a matter may
still be referred to the European Council before a decision
is taken, although there





been changed from a
majority of Member
States to an absolute
figure of eight.
Further changes are
made in the Third Pillar.
Authorising proced-
ures are brought closer
to those in the European
Community: the Com-
mission is now given
the near-exclusive
right of initiative,13 and
the ‘emergency brake’
is similarly removed (or disguised). The Court of Justice
is also given jurisdiction.
Enhanced cooperation is introduced in the Second
Any Member State holding the
Presidency would have had to deal
with an exceptionally difficult agenda.
The IGC was not only limited in
scope, thus more or less precluding
any kind of broad package deal…The
nature of the issues was such that the
negotiations were predictably going to
be less ‘integrative’ than ‘distributive’
in character.http://www.eipa.nl Eipascope 2001/1 7
Pillar – although not, due in particular to UK opposition,
in matters having military or defence implications. In
this case, there is no formal threshold for participation
and authorisation is granted by the Council, subject to
an ‘emergency brake’.
Conclusions
The first conclusion must be that Nice, seen in the long-
term perspective of European integration, was a success
if only because it did not fail, despite the depth of the
differences and the sensitivities involved. The main
goal was achieved, which was to remove the institutional
obstacles which could be used to prevent enlargement.
The more specific stated objectives were to ensure
ease of decision-making in an enlarged Union; to adjust
the relative influence of the Member States in future
Council voting arrangements so as to reflect demographic
weight more fairly; to adapt the size and composition of
the Commission so as to ensure future efficiency and
legitimacy of that institution; and, most broadly, to
welcome the new Members while guaranteeing that
enlargement will not weaken the integration process.
Measured against these aims, however, the results
are certainly not ideal, although some important
qualifications are still called for. In the first place,
despite the strength of the initial criticisms of the Nice
Treaty, almost no-one actually claims that the outcome
of the IGC is completely negative. Some of the less
publicised results are in fact rather positive: notably the
reforms to the Statute of the Court of Justice, the fact that
the European Parliament has at last been given full
standing to challenge Community acts before the Court,
and the strengthening of the Commission’s internal
organisation and of the
role of its President.
Moreover, it must be
recognised that we do
not know how the new
arrangements may work
in practice, and it is far
from certain that the
Nice agreements will
even remain exactly as
they are by the time they
are supposed to come
into effect. The 700
ceiling for MEPs set at Amsterdam was fairly casually
forgotten at Nice. In the next few years, the
Intergovernmental Conference to be convened in 2004
and the accession conferences will make it equally
possible to change some of the conclusions of Nice.
Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that there will be
any improvement in efficiency, understood as the ease
of decision-making. The qualified-majority threshold
has been raised and complicated, while important policy
areas remain subject to unanimity. There is also the risk
that all this fuss about the relative percentages of votes
and majority thresholds may distract attention from the
important non-treaty reforms which need to be
implemented to improve real effectiveness, and from the
challenges posed by the fact that new policies are
increasingly not being managed through legislative
instruments adopted under the classic Community
method.14
It is not clear what Nice will mean for legitimacy.
Transparency has actually suffered, in that the decision-
making system has been made yet more difficult for
people to understand. At least in the short term, Nice has
probably had a negative impact on solidarity. Argu-
ments over relative national weight predominated over
a Community perspective; tensions were exacerbated
about the balance between big and small states; and the
IGC caused positive harm to relationships between
some countries. Strains between France and Germany
were so strong that a summit had to be arranged for
January 2001 to try to soothe the wounds. Benelux was
seriously bruised, while the weighting game led to some
sensitivities on the Iberian peninsula. Moreover, the
image given in the candidate countries was hardly the
most favourable –both in terms of the apparent discrimin-
ation against them vis-à-vis the present Member States
in the distribution of votes and seats, and in terms of the
vision created of the EU as a system based mainly on
national interest and relative power.
It is tempting to ask whether the process and the
results could have been any ‘better’  – meaning, if
nothing else, whether compromises could have been
more easily found and bad feeling avoided. Was there
a lack of adequate leadership? France and Germany, far
from serving as a tandem leading Europe forwards, were
directly at odds. The European Commission, which on
at least some previous occasions had played an important
role of brokerage, exer-
cised comparatively
little influence at Nice.
And the French Gov-
ernment was in a par-
ticularly difficult situ-
ation which made it all
the harder to fulfil the
role expected of the
Presidency.
The criticisms made
of the French Presiden-
cy, however, must be
taken with care. Not everything was in fact managed in
a way which attracted criticism. The French handling of
enhanced cooperation, for example, has been considered
rather effective. Most important, any Member State
holding the Presidency would have had to deal with an
exceptionally difficult agenda. The IGC was not only
limited in scope, thus more or less precluding any kind
of broad package deal in which Member States could
feel that their losses in one issue area were compensated
elsewhere. The nature of the issues was such that the
negotiations were predictably going to be less
‘integrative’ than ‘distributive’ in character. The agenda
did not include any broad policy issues in which the
The frictions at Nice were merely a
predictable reflection of the difficult
process of adjustment to the new
realities of Europe.8 Eipascope 2001/1 http://www.eipa.nl
result – even if national preferences were not completely
satisfied – could still be presented as an overall gain for




fluence which all too







hand, one of an unusual tension between larger and
smaller countries.
As luck had it, the Council Presidency which had to
conclude such an IGC fell to a large country. Among the
larger countries, it had to be precisely that large country
which was most sensitive about the impact of German
unification and EU enlargement on its own relative
weight in European integration. And, just to make
things even tougher, the French President was living in
‘cohabitation’ with a Prime Minister of an opposing
party.
In another such fate-
ful coincidence, when a
compromise had to be
reached over the future
of the Union’s finances
in the first half of 1999,
the Presidency happen-
ed to be held by Ger-
many, the largest net
contributor, at a time
when there was strong





sacrificed part of what it
could have obtained had it felt able to put its full weight
behind the national interest. In that case, however, the
concession was a matter of degree, and the result could
be presented as necessary to achieve a diffuse common
goal. For France at Nice the question was simply and
clearly parity or non-parity – an issue of such symbolic
importance and national sensitivity that President Chirac
obviously felt he could not give way.
In a broader perspective, the frictions at Nice were
merely a predictable reflection of the difficult process of
adjustment to the new realities of Europe. Whatever
else, the IGC has drawn attention to the tectonic shift
which has taken place in Europe in the last 10 years and
which no amount of denial can reverse: Germany is now
by far the largest country in the EU and the centre of the
Union has moved east. These are fundamental constitu-
tional and geopolitical questions which require sensitive
treatment, however, and consensus does not seem to
have been strengthened. The IGC has not helped create
a (re)new(ed) common vision of European integration.
On the contrary, in the
course of 2000, speech-
es by national leaders
highlighted the differ-
ences in approach.
It is in this context
that the European Un-
ion is to set off once
more on the road to an
IGC. Can we make it
any easier next time?
Improvements in the IGC process itself can be
pursued. The difficulties in the IGC 2000 were (again)
partly a result of structural problems. For example, there
appears to be an inadequate link between the top poli-
tical level and the Group of Representatives during the
preparations. It was thus left to the Heads of State or
Government to solve many of the difficult political
problems at the last minute – and without officials. The
confusions and disputes over exactly what was agreed
arose largely because there is no mechanism for the
Heads of State or Government to confirm precisely what
they have agreed be-
fore departing.
It will be equally
important to accom-
pany intergovernment-
al diplomacy with broad-
er processes of public
deliberation. Although
there are no ‘left-overs’
from Nice, as there were
from Amsterdam, the
Conference did adopt a
Declaration on the
Future of the Union
which calls for a deeper
and wider debate about
the future development
of the EU. Following ‘wide-ranging discussions with all
interested parties’, a new IGC is to be convened in 2004
to consider a more precise delimitation of competencies
between the European Union and the Member States;
the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights:
simplification of the Treaties; and the role of national
parliaments.
The emphasis on national parliaments is doubly
significant. On the one hand, it is a response to the
various proposals which were again made in 2000 for a
second (or, for some, third) chamber composed of national
parliamentarians to be added to the Union’s institutional
system as a means to ensure respect for subsidiarity and
to strengthen links between the EU and national political
life. On the other hand, it reflects interest in the parallel
experience in 2000 of the Convention on Fundamental
Rights, which brought together representatives not only
The European Union is to set off once
more on the road to an IGC. Can we
make it any easier next time?
A Convention cannot replace an IGC,
it could certainly help in the future to
prepare fundamental changes in the
EU system on the basis of broader
consensus and deeper support. There
is certainly much to be done.http://www.eipa.nl Eipascope 2001/1 9
of the national governments but also of national
parliaments, as well as the European Parliament and
European Commission. While such a Convention cannot
replace an IGC, it could certainly help in the future to
prepare fundamental changes in the EU system on the
basis of broader consensus and deeper support. There is
certainly much to be done.
________________
NOTES
1 An earlier version of this paper was published as ‘The
European Union After Nice: Ready or Not, Here They
Come!’ in Intereconomics 36:1 (January-February 2001)
pp.19-24.
2 Modified Article 217 TEC.
3 The population threshold could be higher, perhaps 60%,
without losing the advantages of the system.
4 Questioned about the Maltese case, President Chirac was
reported as stating that ‘traditionally, the countries that have
the longest history benefit from an advantage’ as ‘they have
greatly contributed to the European building process’. (Agence
Europe, 11-12 December 2000 p.4).
5 That is, working ‘downwards’ from the largest country in
order to reach the highest number of votes with the lowest
number of countries, the votes of the 13 most populous
countries together total 257.
6 That is, working ‘upwards’ from the least populous country
in order to reach the most votes with the least population, it
is only possible to reach 258 votes by including all Member
States except France, the UK and Germany. This coalition
would represent 281 million citizens out of a total of 481
million, equivalent to 58.4%.
7 These included four categories: provisions expressly to be
adopted by the Member States in accordance with their
respective constitutional rules (e.g. treaty revision, new
accessions etc.); ‘quasi-constitutional’ provisions (e.g. number
of Commissioners, Judges and Advocates-General;
amendment of Commission proposals; committee procedure
etc.); ‘provisions allowing derogations from normal Treaty
rules’ (e.g. measures constituting a step back in movement
of capital or in transport); and ‘provisions in respect of which
the rule of unanimity ensures consistency between internal
and external decisions’. See Annex 3.7 to the Portuguese
Presidency’s Report to the Feira European Council, CONFER
4750/00, 14 June 2000.
8 Appointment of the Secretary-General/High Representative
and Deputy Secretary-General of the Council, CFSP Special
Representatives, Court of Auditors, Economic and Social
Committee, Committee of the Regions; nomination of the
intended President of the Commission, appointment of the
Commission following approval by the Parliament, and
appointment of a new Member of the Commission to fill a
vacancy; approval of the Statute for MEPs, and regulations
governing political parties at European level; approval of the
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Court of First
Instance and Court of Auditors.
9 International agreements in CFSP or JHA where a qualified
majority is required for internal decisions; representation of
the EC in the sphere of economic and monetary union; trade
in services and commercial aspects of intellectual property,
with exceptions; economic, financial and technical cooperation
with third countries.
10 Rules applicable to the structural funds and the cohesion fund
after 1 January 2007; specific actions for economic and social
cohesion outside the structural funds; rapid introduction of
the ECU; incentive measures for anti-discrimination; financial
assistance to a Member State in severe difficulties; support
measures in the industrial sphere; financial regulations.
11 In the case of the European Community, the Amsterdam
Treaty stipulates that the matter is referred to the Council,
meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
Government. The Nice Treaty only refers to the European
Council.
12 New Article 40a(2) TEU; modified Article 121 (2) TEC.
13 Again a semi-brake is left, in that, if the Commission does not
submit a proposal as requested, the Member States concerned
‘may then submit an initiative to the Council designed to
obtain authorisation for the cooperation concerned.’ (new
Article 40a(1) TEU).
14 See Helen Wallace, ‘Some Observations on the Illusions of
Institutional Balance and the Representation of States’ in
Edward Best, Mark Gray and Alexander Stubb (eds.)
Rethinking the European Union: IGC 2000 and Beyond.
(Maastricht: EIPA, 2000) pp. 209-218; and ‘Nice Votes If
You Can Get Them’, Integration, April 2001. 